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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert T. Eberley appeals from a judgment re-entered pursuant to a
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion he filed after his previous post-conviction appeal was
dismissed as untimely.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Eberley with four counts of robbery after he and two
others robbed four teenage boys at Kuna Caves.

(R., pp.20-25, 128-34.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Eberley pied guilty to one count of robbery, the
state dismissed the three remaining counts, and the court imposed a life
sentence with 20 years fixed. (R., pp.122, 141.) In imposing sentence, the court
considered the statements of Eberley's co-defendants about the circumstances
of the robbery, which statements were contained in their respective presentence
investigation reports ("PSl"). 1 (R., p.103.) After imposing sentence, the court
realized Eberley had not had a chance to review his co-defendants' statements
prior to sentencing.

(R., p.104.)

Upon realizing this, the court made the co-

defendants' statements to their respective presentence investigators part of
Eberley's PSI and gave him an opportunity to review those statements and
respond to them. (R., p.104.) At that time, counsel for Eberley lodged a general
objection to the court considering the statements at all because they were not

Eberley and his co-defendants appeared in court for sentencing at the same
time. (R., p.96.)
1

1

originally part of Eberley's PSI.

(R., pp.104-05.)

The court overruled the

objection. (R., p.105.)
After Eberley reviewed the statements, he advised the court that the
actions his co-defendants attributed to him were, in reality, their own actions.
(R., p.105 ("everything that happened in them [sic] statements is what they did,

but, yet, they're saying I did it, and that's crazy, man").) The court considered
Eberley's comments regarding his co-defendants' statements, and "confirm[ed]"
its sentence, noting the victims' statements regarding what happened were
consistent with the co-defendants' version of events. (R., pp.105-06.) Eberley
filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied.

(R., p.141.)

His conviction and

sentence were affirmed on appeal. (R., p.141.)
Eberley subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging:

(1) the court erred in not allowing him to read his co-defendants'

presentence investigation reports until after he was sentenced; (2) ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) he did not receive a particular police report until
he got his PSI. (R., pp.5-12.) Eberley also filed a motion for appointment of
counsel, which the court granted, and Theresa Martin appeared on behalf of
Eberley. (R., pp.34-36, 39, 42.)
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.4447, 76-88.)

The court granted the state's motion in a decision filed May 16,

2011. (R., pp.141-148.) The court entered a separate "Order of Summay [sic]
Dismissal" that same day, dismissing Eberley's petition.

(R., p.149.)

Eberley

filed an unsigned, undated notice of appeal on July 29, 2011. (R., pp.150-153.)

2

The Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal on
August 5, 2011, because Eberley's notice of appeal was untimely.
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, Docket No. 39028-2011. 2)

(Order

Eberley filed a

response to the conditional dismissal acknowledging his appeal was untimely but
claiming the notice "evinces [his] intent to appeal."

(Response to Conditional

Dismissal, Docket No. 39028-2011.) The Court dismissed Eberley's appeal in an
order dated September 21, 2011. (Order Dismissing Appeal, Docket No. 390282011.)
On January 23, 2012, eight months after the district court dismissed his
petition, Eberley filed a "Verified Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order" in his
post-conviction case, seeking relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) (hereafter
"Motion"). (R., pp.167-172.) In his Motion, Eberley asserted Martin never mailed
him a copy of the court's order dismissing his petition and that "the complete lack
of legal representation within his case" was an "extraordinary circumstance"
entitling him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (R., p.168 n. 1, pp.170-172.) Eberley
requested counsel to assist him in pursuing his Motion, which the court granted.
(R., pp.180-182.)

Paul Taber filed a notice of appearance and a motion to

unseal PSI "to explore allegations made in the Petition for Post Conviction
Relief," which the court granted. (R., pp.183, 185, 187-88.)
At a subsequent status conference, Taber stated that the prosecutor
spoke with Martin who "confirmed that Mr. Eberley did ask her to appeal and she

2

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state has filed a Motion to Take Judicial
Notice of the Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, the Response to
Conditional Dismissal, and the Order Dismissing Appeal in Eberley v. State,
3

did not appeal." (4/19/2012 Tr., p.1, L.20 - p.2, L.1.) Taber asked the court "just
to re-date the judgment" so Eberley could appeal. (4/19/2012 Tr., p.2, Ls.1-3.)
The state consented to the requested relief (4/19/2012 Tr., p.2, Ls.5-6), and the
court re-entered an Order of Summary Dismissal and a Judgment on April 23,
2012 (4/19/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-24; R., pp.193-94). Eberley filed a timely notice
of appeal from the re-entered Order of Summary Dismissal and the Judgment.
(R., pp.196-198.)

Docket No. 39028-2011. These documents will be cited by their respective titles.
4

ISSUES
Eberley states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the post
conviction relief petition.
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
The Idaho Supreme Court has already dismissed Eberley's appeal
from the denial of post-conviction relief because the appeal was untimely.
Should this appeal likewise be dismissed because the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reinstate Eberley's appellate rights from the May 16, 2011 order
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition?
2.
Even if the Court concludes Eberley may proceed in this appeal,
has Eberley failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction
petition given his failure to allege a genuine issue of material fact to warrant an
evidentiary hearing or otherwise establish he is entitled to relief on any of his
claims?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Have Authority To Consider Eberley's Untimely Rule
60(b) Motion Nor Is Re-Entry Of An Order For Purposes Of Reinstating Appellate
Rights A Proper Ground For Relief Under Rule 60(b)

A.

Introduction
On May 16, 2011, the district court entered an order summarily dismissing

Eberley's post-conviction petition.

(R., p.149.)

Because Eberley filed an

untimely notice of appeal from the court's dismissal order, his appeal was
dismissed. (Order Dismissing Appeal, Docket No. 39028-2011.) Eight months
after the court dismissed his petition, and four months after his appeal was
dismissed, Eberley filed an untimely Rule 60(b) motion claiming ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

(R., pp.167-172.)

As relief, Eberley

asked the court to re-enter judgment so that his appeal rights could be
reinstated; the state agreed to this form of relief and the court granted Eberley's
request. (4/19/2012 Tr., p.2, Ls.5-6, p.4, Ls.18-24; R., pp.193-94.) Because the
district court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Eberley's appeal, this appeal should
be dismissed.

B.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider Eberley's
Untimely Rule 60(b) Motion Or Grant Him Any Relief In Relation Thereto
Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. reads, in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

6

other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (6) not more than
six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken.
"[T]he time requirement set forth in Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional and may not
be extended 'except to the extent and under the conditions stated' in the Rule
itself." Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607 (1996).

The term

"made," as used in the rule, requires that the motion be "filed prior to the six
month time limit or is served within that time period and then filed 'within a
reasonable time thereafter."' 19.,_ (quoting I.R.C.P. 5(d)(1)).
Eberley's Motion sought relief pursuant to section (6). (R., p.167.) As
such, he was required to file the Motion within six months of the court's summary
dismissal order. Eberley failed to do so. Rather, Eberley waited more than eight
months before filing his Motion. The Motion was, therefore, untimely and the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Eberley's request for relief. 3
In addition to being untimely, Eberley's Motion was not a proper request
for relief under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) authorizes relief "from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding" for the reasons enumerated in the rule. Eberley did not,
however, seek relief from the order of summary dismissal, he sought

3

Although the prosecutor agreed to the relief Eberley requested, it is wellestablished that parties cannot consent to jurisdiction. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100
Idaho 414, 423, 599 P.2d 985, 994 (1979) ("as we all know, parties cannot
stipulate a court into jurisdiction which it does not have").
7

reinstatement of his appellate rights from that order.
authorize this type of relief.

Rule 60(b) does not

If Eberley wanted to reinstate his appellate rights

due to the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, he should
have filed a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908; Eberley failed to do so.
Eberley cannot defeat the Supreme Court's prior order dismissing his
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction by filing an untimely and otherwise
improper motion under Rule 60(b)(6). The Court should, therefore, dismiss this
appeal.

II.
Even If This Court Allows Eberley To Proceed In This Appeal, Eberley Has
Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition

A

Introduction
The district court summarily dismissed Eberley's post-conviction petition in

its entirety. (R., pp.141-49.) Eberley claims the court erred in a variety of ways;
however, a review of the record and the applicable legal standards shows
Eberley failed to carry his burden of demonstrating he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing or otherwise entitled to post-conviction relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

8

C.

Eberley Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 194906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must
accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to
accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to
dismissing the petition. Jg,_ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the
original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." Jg,_
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1.

Eberley Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That The Court
Erred In Considering His Co-Defendants' Statements When It
Imposed Sentence Or His Claim That Counsel Should Have Moved
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea When The Court Did So

In his petition, Eberley alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.9-10.) Eberley contended he wanted
to withdraw his plea so he could "confront the lies in his co-defendnts [sic] PSI
statements and to prove [he] did not hit anyone in the back of the head!" (R.,
pp.8-10.) The court dismissed this claim, concluding Eberley failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that such a motion would have been granted. (R.,
pp.147-48.)

Eberley contends summary dismissal of this claim was improper,

arguing "the post conviction claim does not actually require that the motion to
withdraw guilty plea be granted, because if it was merely made, it would have at
least prevented the court from sentencing [him]

based on undisclosed

statements which blamed him." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)
Eberley's arguments lack merit. To overcome summary dismissal of hs
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Eberley was required to demonstrate that
"(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether counsel's performance was
deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency
prejudiced [Eberley's] case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d
362,

367-68 (2008) (internal

citations omitted);

see also Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a petitioner alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice). To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Eberley "to
show that

his attorney's conduct fell

10

below an

objective standard of

reasonableness.

This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that

trial counsel was competent and diligent." !st "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation."

!st To establish prejudice, Eberley was

required to show "a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient
performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

!st

Eberley's argument that it is irrelevant whether the motion would be
granted is erroneous.

It is well-established that when a defendant claims his

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion, "the district court may consider
the probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Wolf v. State, 152
Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129
Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App.1996)).

"Where the alleged

deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test."

!st at 67-68, 266 P.3d at

1172-73.
Moreover, Eberley's argument assumes counsel was deficient for failing
to file the motion; he was not.

Rather, it was well within counsel's decision-

making authority to do exactly what he did - object to the court's consideration ·of
the co-defendants' statements and ask the court for permission to retain the
statements "for purposes of preparation of a Rule 35 motion." (R., p.104; see

11

also p.106 (defense counsel puts the court and state "on notice" that he is
"confident" he will "be filing a Rule 35 motion and following up with an appeal as
well").)
Eberley's argument also erroneously assumes that the mere act of filing a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea would have "prevented the court from
sentencing [him] based on" his co-defendants' statements, yet he fails to explain
why this is so. Indeed, Eberley cites no legal authority to support the proposition
that had counsel moved to withdraw Eberley's plea the moment the court
mentioned it was considering the "undisclosed" statements of the co-defendants
the court would have been required to stop the sentencing, much less grant the
motion or not consider information it deemed relevant to its decision. Nor was
counsel's failure to do so deficient. The normal course of action when a court
indicates it is considering information the defendant believes it cannot consider is
to object; it is not to orally move to withdraw the guilty plea.

Further, while

counsel in this case did not interrupt the court's pronouncement of sentence with
an objection, the issue was subsequently addressed the same day4 at which
time counsel objected. (R., p.104.)
Counsel's decision not to file a motion to withdraw Eberley's guilty plea
was particularly appropriate under the

4

circumstances since the court's

The record does not reveal how much time elapsed between the court's
pronouncement of sentence and the subsequent proceedings wherein Eberley
was given the opportunity to read the co-defendants' statements. However, it
appears the discussion may have occurred at the conclusion, or in the midst of,
the co-defendants' sentencing hearings since the record does reflect that
Eberley was sentenced first and the court received the co-defendants'
permission to include their statements in Eberley's PSI. (R., pp.96, 104.)
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consideration of certain information at sentencing in no way rendered Eberley's
guilty plea invalid.

Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by I.C.R.

33(c), which provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Pursuant Rule 33(c), a motion to withdraw made before sentencing may be
liberally granted, but must be granted only if the defendant proves either that the
plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made or that there is another
just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530,
535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118
Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). A motion to withdraw a
guilty plea after sentencing should be granted only to "correct manifest injustice."
I.C.R. 33(c).
Even applying the more lenient pre-sentencing standard, Eberley failed to
establish his motion would have been granted at any time, much less in the
middle of his sentencing hearing. Eberley claims otherwise, noting the following
circumstances he apparently believes would have qualified as just reasons to
withdraw his plea: (1) the prosecutor requested a sentence nowhere "near the
five year sentence that his attorney was requesting" and the request was "based
in part" on the assertion that Eberley hit one of the victims with a rock, which was
contradicted by the police report wherein the officer indicated he could not see

13

any physical evidence of such 5 ; (2) he "learned" at sentencing that the
prosecutor "request[ed] such a significant sentence because of the allegations
that he had threatened to rape" one of the victims; and (3) the court concluded,
based on the co-defendants statements, that "he was the most culpable."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.)

None of these would have qualified as "just

reasons" to allow Eberley to withdraw his plea. Eberley implicitly acknowledges
as much, noting it "may not have changed whether or not [he] was guilty of
robbery," but the reasons "were certainly relevant to the sentence that would be
imposed for it." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) From this Eberley concludes, "a desire
to be able to challenge the statements at trial (that he was unable to
meaningfully challenge at sentencing) in an effort to receive a shorter sentence
is a legitimate reason to go to trial and a just reason to allow withdrawal of the
guilty plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument is illogical. Exactly why
Eberley believes a court would have considered different information at
sentencing if he had gone to trial versus pleading guilty is unclear. While he
claims he could have challenged the statements had he gone to trial, he could
also challenge them at sentencing and he, in fact, did just that.

Eberley

repeatedly denied hitting one of the victims with a rock and claimed he only
threatened to rape the victim as a joke. (R., p.102.) Eberley failed to provide

In his petition, Eberley raised a separate claim relating to the timing of the
disclosure of the police report, which he did not receive until after he pied guilty.
(R., p.6.) On appeal, Eberley does not pursue this as a separate claim, but
contends it "is inextricably intertwined with the claim regarding the motion to
withdraw [his] guilty plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) The state will, therefore,
only address it in this context as well.
5
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any evidence in support of his petition that he could have used at trial or
sentencing to challenge the victims' and co-defendants' claims about his actions.
Nor does he identify on appeal what that evidence might be. Instead, Eberley
asserts "[h]ad the motion simply been made then appropriate argument could
have been made and perhaps evidence produced (the sister) before sentence
was imposed." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) However, nothing prevented Eberley
from presenting evidence from his sister at the time of sentencing or in the form
of an affidavit in support of his petition. In fact, the record reflects that Eberley's
sister was at his sentencing hearing and available to address the court in
addition to the letter she already submitted. 6 (R., pp.101-02.)
Eberley's argument is also ironic given that the one mitigating factor found
by the court, and that Eberley emphasized at sentencing, was that he accepted
responsibility. (R., pp.101-102 (argument and allocution highlighting acceptance
of responsibility),

Because of this, the court did not follow the state's

recommendation for 25 years fixed, but instead imposed a fixed 20-year term.
(R., p.103 ("They requested 25 years to life imprisonment. Because you have
accepted responsibility, I am going to go with 20 years, 20 years fixed with
indeterminate life."). That he now claims he would have preferred to go to trial in
order to challenge the co-defendants' and victims' statements is inconsistent with
his position at the time of sentencing.

6

Although the record does not reflect whether she was still present after the
court allowed Eberley to review the co-defendants' statements, the substance of
those statements was part of the original sentencing at which she was present
and Eberley invoked her name at that time.
15

Contrary to Eberley's statement, whether a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea would have been granted is relevant and both the record and the law
support the district court's determination that such a motion would have been
denied.
In a related claim, Eberley contends the court erred in summarily
dismissing his claim that the court erred in considering the co-defendants' PSI
statements when it imposed sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) According
to Eberley, such reliance was improper because, although the court allowed him
the opportunity to review the statements, its failure to do so prior to sentencing
was improper because by that time the court "had made up its mind" and after he
was sentenced "he did not have his witness available." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
Eberley also complains "the procedure used with the PSI does not give any sort
of assurance of reliability or fairness" because although the victims' statements
about what happened were consistent with Eberley's co-defendants' statements,
this does not make their statements "true."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.)

According to Eberley, this flaw in his sentencing proceedings entitled him to
withdraw his plea.

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

For the reasons already stated,

Eberley is incorrect that any perceived flaw in the information the court
considered for sentencing would provide a basis to withdraw his plea. Moreover,
any objection to the court's conduct at sentencing could, and should, have been
raised on direct appeal. See I.C. § 19-4908. Eberley is essentially asking this
Court to grant the same relief he could have and should have requested on
direct appeal but did not. This Court should decline to do so.
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2.

Eberley Failed To Allege A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling
Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Provide Him With Transcripts Of His Jail
Calls

In his petition, Eberley alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to
provide him with transcripts of his jail calls. (R., p.10.) The court dismissed this
claim, noting "[t]here is no evidence that such transcripts exist" and, in any event,
Eberley "would have personal knowledge of his own phone conversations." (R.,
p.147.) The court also noted Eberley's failure to demonstrate resulting prejudice.
(R., p.147.)
On appeal, Eberley contends the district court "misses the point" because,
although he acknowledged in his affidavit that his attorney told him no such
transcripts exist (R., p.9), he did not "want them to learn what was in them"
(Appellant's Brief, p.17). It is Eberley who misses the point. It was his burden to
allege a genuine issue of material fact to support his claim that counsel was
deficient for not preparing transcripts of his jail calls for some unstated purpose
and that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's failure to submit to his
demands in this regard. Having failed to meet this burden, Eberley cannot show
error in the summary dismissal of this claim. 7

7

It is also worth noting that, in his guilty plea questionnaire, Eberley answered
"no" to the question, "Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do
that has not been done?" (R., p.112.)
17

3.

Eberley Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Provide Him
With Paperwork Showing The Dismissal Of A Misdemeanor The
State Ultimately Did Not Pursue

Eberley's petition also contains an allegation that counsel was ineffective
for failing to provide him proof that a misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance charge was dismissed as part of his plea agreement. (R., p.9.) The
court dismissed this claim because Eberley "was never charged with this crime."
(R., p.147.)

Eberley contends otherwise, citing the unsigned Amended

Complaint attached to his petition as Exhibit 1. (Appellant's Brief, p.18 (citing R.,
p.18).) While the state initially filed a complaint against Eberley that included a
charge for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 8 that complaint
was superseded by an Indictment that did not include the misdemeanor charge
but instead alleged four counts of robbery.

As such, the district court was

ultimately correct in its conclusion that Eberley was not charged with a
misdemeanor possession crime.
In any event, Eberley's post-conviction claim was that counsel was
ineffective for failing

to provide

misdemeanor was dismissed.

him with the paperwork showing the

On appeal, Eberley has failed to provide any

argument or authority to support remand for further consideration of this claim.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) Counsel could not provide a non-existent dismissal
order and Eberley undoubtedly can obtain a copy of the Indictment and
Amended Information, which the state attached to its motion for summary

A signed, file-stamped copy of the complaint is attached as Appendix D to the
state's motion to take judicial filed contemporaneously herewith.
8
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dismissal. (R., pp.128-134.) Exactly what relief he expects this Court to provide
in relation to this claim is a mystery.

Summary dismissal of this claim was

appropriate.
Because the court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Eberley's appellate
rights in his post-conviction case, this appeal should be dismissed. Even if the
Court declines to dismiss this appeal, because Eberley failed to allege a genuine
issue of material fact to warrant an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims or
otherwise show he was entitled to post-conviction relief, Eberley has failed to
establish the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this appeal or,
alternatively, affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing Eberley's
petition for post-conviction relief.
th

DATED this 26 day of April 2013.

JE S AM. LORELLO
Dep y Attorney General

19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26 th day of April 2013, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
GREG S. SILVEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 565
STAR, ID 83669

20

